Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыс аяқталғаннан бері экономикалық даму саласында экономикалық модельдер дамудың экономикалық емес түсіндірмелерін маргиналдырды
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The traditional clan networksThe ethnocentric theory holds that the prevailing moral code of the West defines corruption on moral grounds and may not be equally effective in defining corruption in non-Western cultures (Van Roy, 1970). In Kazakhstan many traditions formed at times when Kazakh people led nomadic life. Clan helping behavior was essential to the survival of all members, thus they developed strong ties and the feeling of obligation toward other clan members. Several authors discuss these traditions and emphasize the importance of family and community support (Schatz, 2000, 2004; Abylkhozhin, 2007; Orazbayeva, 2005b; Amerkulov, 1998, 2000; Rigi, 2004; Oka, 2013). Historical records trace clan obligations back to the collectivist Mongol laws (Yassa) rather than more individualist Islamic laws (Riasanovsky, 1997). Authors from Western and Eastern traditions recognize the influence of gift giving and tribal culture on public life in modern Kazakhstan. The chairman of Transparency International in Kazakhstan argued that nepotism and gift giving were widespread in the Kazakh government, and neither nepotism nor gift giving were regarded as corruption by modern Kazakhs (O’Neil, 2009). Other authors directly linked the gift giving tradition to modern corrupt practices in Kazakhstan (Olcott, 2005; Schatz, 2004; Rigi 2004). In Kazakhstan, the tradition of clan support formed a modern believe that the promotion of clan interests was ethical. Orazbaeva argued that all Kazakhs have always been united by this unique model of social interaction. She writes that, “…the foundation of Kazakh nation …was its stable and socially isolated system of genealogic kinship, which penetrated all levels of Kazakh social structure… and facilitated the formation of certain ethical principles...” (Orazbayeva, 2005a, p. 43). Mutual help was at the core of the ethical system in Kazakhs clans. In modern Kazakhstan, clan connections are less visible in large cities, yet in small towns and rural areas community members continue to donate labor, food, clothes and money to clan members in events like wedding, childbirth, or funerals. However, when wealth and power are at stake, powerful clan leaders in state bureaucracy and political offices surround themselves with loyal clan members and remove those of other clans from decision-making positions. The internal cohesion of clans evolves into nepotism, protectionism, and corrupt networks. Amrekulov (2000) studied elite divisions in Kazakhstan politics and government and concluded that clan structure has gained the utmost importance under the modern conditions of social stratification of Kazakh society during transition to a market-based economy. Nowadays, it is difficult to separate traditional gratitude and corruption. De Graaf (2007) argues that in countries with gift giving traditions, officials face a difficult choice when they encounter the situation of public versus private obligations. He explains clan loyalty by association with family tradition – “…it’s about values, norms and moral obligations in our daily personal and social lives. Even though obligations from the micro morality are based on informal norms, they are very strong – much stronger than our moral obligations towards strangers. Moral obligations in our personal lives are characterized by reciprocity: we help friends and family just as we expect them to help us” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 54). In Kazakhstan, the tradition of assistance to close and remote family members and neighbors has laid the foundation of business support for those regarded as clan “insiders” versus those regarded as “outsiders.” One vivid example of clan enrichment in Kazakhstan is the family of the current president of the country. Schatz discusses the political consequences of clan culture in Kazakhstan: “…In the central apparatus, Nazarbaev [president of Kazakhstan] worked strongly to privilege the members of his extended family and core members of the Elder umbrella clan more generally, as patterns of political appointments suggest” (Schatz, 2005, p. 240). Clan members in public office are expected to provide support to those in business, and businessmen reciprocate by returning favors in kind and in cash. Amrekulov supports this thesis: “Kazakh clan has become the preponderate form of actual social-political structure of Kazakh society. For the majority of Kazakhstan leaders, clan has become the base of power and enrichment – some clan members provide political support, while others get hold of the most profitable monopolized businesses” (2000). Modern Kazakhs perceive a successful public career of a clan member not as an individual achievement, but as a clan achievement. This perception creates a conflict between public and private obligations of government officials. More often than not, loyalty to a clan wins over loyalty to a wider public because the “loss of face” and condemnation by clan members are immediate and more tangible than public denunciation (Dzhandosova et al., 2002). The Sange Research Group organized data collection from three focus-groups with total number of 18 participants of various ages and occupations. The results show that participants perceived close connection between a career in public office and an affiliation with a clan (Dzhandosova et al., 2002). Chart 9 below presents combined focus group responses to the question about the promotion criteria in a public office. Chart 9. Modes of promotion in public office in Kazakhstan Source: Dzhandosova et al. (2002) Chart 9 suggests that 13 out of 18 focus-group participants most often recognized clan affiliation as the prime criteria for promotion in a public office. The at-will employment comes second with 12 participants mentioning this criterion. The visual analysis of the focus-group participants choices confirm that promotion criteria are mostly based on corrupt practices such as the size of a bribe, ethnicity, and political loyalty. In support of the above research results, Abdykarimov et al. found that 59% of experts and 54% of regular respondents in Kazakhstan regarded tribalism and domination of clan interests as the main causes of corruption. Clan networks in Kazakhstan are a reality of everyday political and economic decision making in government. Currently, Kazakhs have removed almost all ethnic Russians and other minorities from government positions and hired ethnic Kazakhs. In the Northern Kazakhstan, where Russians still hold a majority (55%), all elected and appointed high level positions are taken by ethnic Kazakhs (Profile series: Kazakhstan, 1994). To summarize the role of traditions, I argue that the long-standing tradition of clan support and gift giving was reconstituted during the transition period. The ethnocentric approach describes how corruption is facilitated by a local culture rather then by a departure from a prevailing morality in Western cultures (Van Roy, 1970). In order to accumulate wealth quickly, powerful leaders need only two conditions – unstable laws and a tightly knit group of unconditionally loyal collaborators. Market reforms ensured the first condition and the existing clan culture helped organizing a corrupt network of collaborators. Even today, modern Kazakhs regard internal clan support as the right thing to do, which contrasts the ethical norms of neutrality in a public office in the Western tradition. The Van Roy’s ethnocentric approach helps understanding the historical conditions that facilitated the systemic corruption in Kazakhstan. жүктеу/скачать 0,54 Mb. Достарыңызбен бөлісу:
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