Байланысты: Lecture 6. Structure of the international negotiation process
Stages
Zartman (1976) cites the Vietnam peace negotiations as having passed through two distinct phases. The first concerned the U.S. attempt to find a formula acceptable to both sides: freezing the stalemate in place without removing either the North Vietnamese or the Saigon regime from South Vietnam, and then selling the idea to Hanoi.
The second concerned a search for the details that followed from the agreed image, “a process that was closer to discovery than to convergence”. On the other hand, he points out that there were a few cases of incremental decision making, such as the size of the International Control Commission, but these were rare.
The SALT process has consisted largely of a search for referent principles and then for implementing details: The central problem has been one of shifting the parties’ conception of nuclear parity from one permitting deterrence to one foreclosing coercion. Once the principle is agreed on, the details of disarmament can be hung on, such as a search for numbers of launchers versus missiles or quantity of warheads, or dividing the strategic force structure into first-line and second-line forces.
This distinction between phases suggests that certain conceptual problems must be resolved before bargaining on the details can take place. Problems at the conceptual stage are illustrated by negotiations as diverse as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks and the Philippines military base rights negotiation.
MBFR is an example of a negotiation that has not resolved key conceptual problems: It is not clear how to conceive offensive force strength, a necessary preliminary agreement before the detailed adjustments in force size are entertained. In the case of the Philippines, a lack of agreement on a general framework of principles to serve as guidelines prevented the two sides from proceeding to a discussion of specific articles.
The negotiation was stalled at this stage. The Philippine delegation, in particular, insisted that an agreement on principles must precede detailed consideration of issues.
This process is set in motion around certain coordinating events referred to as “benchmarks”. Such events as the signing of a declaration of principles, a framework agreement, or an interim agreement signal progress.
Progress can be depicted as passage from one stage to another, such as an agenda debate, a search for guiding principles, defining the issues, bargaining for favorable concession exchanges, and a search for implementing details. Although these stages are presumed to occur in any negotiation, their relative duration is likely to vary from one case to another. This can be illustrated.
The extended agenda debate in the Seabed arms control negotiation is set off against the first-round agenda agreement obtained in the Spain military bases negotiation. The strong influence of previous agreements serves to provide precedents for such negotiations as the renewal of cultural exchanges and the extension of status-of-forces agreements among allies.
The previous agreements limit the area of dispute to one of merely updating those agreements. These negotiations move quickly to the bargaining stage (e.g., adjustments in compensation, taking account of inflation) and then the provisions-implementing stage. Similarly, trade negotiations consist for the most part of bargaining to work out an acceptable exchange ratio.
In sharp contrast to these types of forums are the various arms control negotiations. The examples of SALT and MBFR, suggested above, illustrate the tedious process of achieving an agreement in principle. Even when this stage is accomplished, the search for implementing details delays the attainment of an agreed package.
