in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting

217 
2. Understanding itself is a "conversation"; conversation is a language 
process; 
3. The text is also a party in the conversation. "Everything we have said 
characterizing the situation of two people coming to an understanding in 
conversation has a genuine application to hermeneutics, which is concerned 
with understanding texts" 

1q, p. 528

. 
4. The language, through the text, "fixes" the meaning. The meaning of 
the text is self-alienated, but it prevents the arbitrariness of interpretations. 
The latter is practicable in a normative way. "Understanding is drawn on 
entirely by the subject matter. Hence unclear thinking and "bad" writing are 
not exemplary cases where the art of hermeneutics can show itself in its full 
glory but, on the contrary, limiting cases which undermine the basic 
presupposition of all hermeneutical success, namely the clear unambiguity of 
the intended meaning. […] Because the important thing is communicating the 
text's true meaning, interpreting it is already subject to a substantial norm"

1r, 
p. 539-540

.
5. Language is the medium of understanding; 
6. Language and understanding are semantic and symbolic-articulating 
systems. "This understanding of the subject matter must take the form of 
language. It is not that the understanding subsequently put into words; rather, 
the understanding occurs-whether in the case of a text or a dialogue with 
another person who raises an issue with us-is the coming-into-language of the 
thing itself. Thus we will first consider the structure of dialogue proper in 
order to specify the character of that other form of dialogue that is the 
understanding of texts." 

1s, p. 522

:
7. Mutual appertaining of language and the world. "Language is not just 
one of man's possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man 
has a world at all. The world as world exists for man as for no other creature 
that is in the world. But this world is verbal in nature." 

1t, p. 609

: 
8. Language describes the world, the world exists through language. 
"Language-views are worldviews"

4, p. 60: 1u, p. 609

. Gadamer clarifies: 
"But the ground of this statement is more important, namely that language has 
no independent life apart from the world that comes to language within it. Not 
only the world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too, has 
its real being only in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that 
language is originally human means, at the same time, that man's being-in-
the-world is primordially linguistic." 

1v, p. 609-610

; 
9. Language is not a barrier between understanding and the world. "The 
verbal world in which we live is not a barrier that prevents knowledge of 

218 
being-in-itself but fundamentally embraces everything in which our insight 
can be enlarged and deepened." 

1w, p. 615

; 
10. The relation between language and world reveals that that 
hermeneutic experience is verbal in nature 

1x, p. 610

. This provides new 
opportunities for its understanding and studying because "the fact that human 
experience of the world is verbal in nature broadens the horizon of our 
analysis of hermeneutical experience." 

1y, p. 615

;
11. The semantic dimension of the world is bounded by and within the 
linguistic dimension. The wholeness and perspective of the world is 
linguistically construed. "This is of fundamental importance, for it makes the 
expression of the world in itself problematical. The criterion for the 
continuing expansion of our own world picture is not given by a "world in 
itself" that lies beyond all language. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of the 
human experience of the world means that, whatever language we use, we 
never succeed in seeing anything but an ever more extended aspect, a "view" 
of the world.[…] This is part of the meaning in which every human, 
linguistically constituted view of the world live."

1z, p. 615-616

. 
It is indisputable that Gadamer seeks to justify the finiteness of human 
knowledge. On the other hand, its capacity is seen in achieving understanding 
of things. The author's set purpose requires that avoided should be endless 
interpretations with diminished potential for reaching agreement. Identifying 
knowledge as a constant factor, he strikes a balance between its universality 
and relativity. The method of the natural sciences is not applicable in the 
human sciences. Hence it is impossible to validate their criterion for 
objectivity and scientific soundness in the same way. It is understanding that 
presents the methodological approach to these. Understanding directly 
correlates with a person's initial experience of the surrounding reality, of the 
real world. What characterizes understanding is its historicity and finiteness. 
The difficulty, bordering on inability to achieve objectivity of knowledge in 
the human sciences, is due to the nature of understanding as primal human 
experience – experience that shapes and characterizes the knowledge of the 
individual. Yet, this understanding has a constitutive meaning. It originates 
and draws on the cognitive apparatus of being conversational. Therein, 
however, lies its possible highly subjective liability to interpretations. This 
would lead to cognitive disorientation. Gadamer's methodological solution is 
to bring the "things themselves" as centers of meaning. These meanings are 
the product of the hermeneutical dialogue. Thus, highlighted is a clear 
delimitation of the hermeneutic process. Yet, the "things themselves" are a 
reality. With respect to understanding, they are situated outside and 
independently, they are available before it, they are instrumentalized as 

219 
universal norms. They are obviously unhistorical. In this way, understanding 
seems to be both historical and conditionally historical. Here a new difficulty 
arises. It stems from language in its capacity as medium and essential 
expression of understanding. Language reflects the world, the realities. 
Meaning is only possible through language. Language is historical. Difficulty 
– the pre-linguistic nature of "things themselves". Gadamer's attempt to 
resolve it is to allow for meaning-forming and special linguistic entities in a 
meaning-constructive dialogue. There is, of course, the requirement of 
balance. This type of dialogue is Gadamer's cognitive situation. Therefore, 
we can agree, in general, that "philosophical hermeneutics is not a 
methodology of the humanities, but rather a reflection on the general 
conditions of understanding" 

1aa, p. 702

. 
Literature 
1. Gadamer H.-G. Truth and Method // Basic Features of Philosophical Hermeneutics 
//, EA, Pleven, 1997, 1997a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, aa. 
- 708 p. 
2. Heidegger M. Being and Time, Marin Drinov, Sofia, 2005a, b, c, d, e, f. - 368 p. 
3. Strauss L. Spinoza's Critique of Religion, University of Chicago Press (1965). - 351 
p. 
4. Humboldt W. v., On the diversity of the human language structure… (1st ed. 1836), 

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