Политические репрессии в периодической печати

Политические репрессии в периодической печати 

В  статье  проанализированы  сведения,  которые  были  опубликованы  на  страницах  областной  газеты 

Западного  Казахстана  «Екпінді  құрылыс»,  Ордынской  районной  газеты  «Жаңа  жол»,  Жангалинской 

районной газеты «Социалды еңбек», Мангистауской районной газеты «Колхоз жолы», Жымпитинской 

районной газеты «Қызыл Ту». На основе этих материалов автором выявлено отрицательное влияние 

гонений  и  преследований  сталинского  режима  на  содержание  этих  газетных  изданий.  Описаны  бес-

причинные гонения и преследования таких деятелей, как Мереш Даулетияров, Сериккали  Жакыпов, 

Боран  Айтмагамбетов,  Адилбай  Жылкелдин,  которые  внесли  существенный  вклад  в развитие  газет-

ных изданий в Западном Казахстане. 

 

K.Sundetuly 

Political repressions are in periodic printing 

This article contains data which were published in « Ekpindi Kurylys»  newspaper of the Western Kazakh-

stan, «Zhana Zhol» Orda newspaper, «Socialdy Enbek»  Zhangaly regional newspaper, «Kolkhoz Zholy» 

Mangistauregional newspaper, «Kyzyl Tu» Zhympiti regional newspaper. Having read these articles, it be-

comes obvious thatthe Stalinistpersecutions and repressionswere harsh and impacted on these newspaper edi-

tions. Author describes persecutions and prosecutions of public leaderslike Meresh Dauletiyarov, Serikkali 

Zhakypov, Boran Aytmagambetov, Adilbay Zhylkeldin, who contributed a lot to the development of Western 

Kazakhstan newspaper editions. 

 

 

References 

1  Socialdy Kazakhstan, 1932, June, 8. 

2  Zhana Zhol, 1932, December, 26. 

3  Ekpindi Kurylys, 1933, January, 4. 

4  Socialdy Enbek, 1935, October, 30. 

5  Record office Western to the Kazakhstan area, 37, 6, 76–82 p. 

6  Kolkhoz Zholy, 1937, April, 2. 

7  Kyzyl Tu, 1937, July, 4; Kyzyl tu, 1937, June, 17. 

8  Kolkhozshylar Uny, 1937, August, 29. 

9  Kumar. Ekpendi Zhol, 1938, May, 30. 

10  Lenin Zholy, 1938, October, 2 

11  Uralskyi vodnik, 1937, October, 24. 

12  Political repressions in Kazakhstan in 1937–1938, Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1998, 336 p. (Archive of President RK). 

13  Archive of President of Republic of Kazakhstan, 708, 4/1, 16 p. 

 

 

 

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UDC 070 

M.Horváth, М.Freshly  

University of West Hungary, Szombathely, Hungary 

(E-mail: freslim@mail.ru) 

The formation of electoral culture in Hungary 

The article is devoted to the study of the culture of parliamentary elections in Hungary. The author addresses 

the experience of European electoral systems (Poland, Germany) and analyzes the particularities of the Hun-

garian electoral system after the political revolution. It proves the necessity of increase of political culture of 

electorate, including through the media. 

Key words: representative democracy, Hungarian Roundtable Negotiations, an electoral reform, the 1989 

change of the political system, a three-tier and — two-round system, the German and the Polish electoral sys-

tems, the new Electoral Act of 2011. 

 

Introduction 

When looking into modern democracies the square one question is what the relationship between the 

people and their representation is like. What the answers to this question tend to share is the view that the 

people, as a political subject, is represented by its elected representatives in an institutional system of power. 

Therefore it is fair to say that the democratic representative system «makes the people the subject and part of 

the institutional power, and not an opposing political subject» [1;7]. 

As the basic forms of exercising public power both direct and indirect democracy dates back to the An-

cient Times. While direct democracy is governed by the principles of freedom and equality, representative 

democracy means political institutions in which the decisions are made by the majority voting of democrati-

cally elected representatives. Hungary is a modern parliamentary democracy, which was formed during the 

changing of the political system between 1989 and 1991. 

The changing of the political system 

Including legal, administrative, economic and cultural changes in addition to the political ones, as this 

was characteristic of periods following the collapse of Eastern, Central and Southern European communist 

regimes, the changing of the political system and the subsequent transitional period took place between 1989 

and 1991. In these countries this allowed democratic and pluralist systems to be created by dismissing the 

authoritarian communist political regimes. 

Huntington (1991) describes the transition and the changing of the political system in Eastern Europe as 

‘democracy’s third wave’ affecting more countries and societies than ever before. Eastern European socialist 

systems were primarily regarded as permanent regimes and not as transitional ones. The changes in Hungary 

in the 1980s were regarded as transitions within socialism, proving the capacity of the socialist regime to 

reform itself instead of foreboding the collapse of the entire system amidst a legitimation crisis. 

The changing of the political system in Hungary was both unforeseen and unprecedented in terms of 

historical international changes. The ‘empire’ of the European socialist countries collapsed in ten countries at 

a pace unprecedented in history, starting with Poland, Hungary, East-Germany in July, September, Novem-

ber 1989 respectively, only to be followed by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in December 1989. 

Some twenty new states were created in the territory of the crumpled ‘empire’. As opposed to changes in 

Hungary this involved the crush of the institutional political power in the German Democratic Repub-

lic (DDR) and in Romania, and the maiming of the machinery of state in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. 

Huntington sees Hungary as one of the prototypes of the political changes in the Soviet Bloc, where the 

elite of the authoritarian regime in power played a role in doing away with it and in building a democratic 

system instead. 

As Kukorelli puts it, ‘Bargained, negotiated, consensual, velvet and bloodless revolution in the rule of 

law, democratic and peaceful transition. Shifting, amending and changing of the system. Do we actually have 

the right words for 1989 to describe history faithfully and truthfully? It is high time to clarify this, all the 

more so because today many look on 1989 as the «original sin», calling what happened back in 1989 a re-

placement of the system or flat-out a mere «changing of the gangsters» [2; 1]. Kukorelli adds the adjective 

M.Horváth, М.Freshly 

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«constitutional» to the term «changing of the political system», in agreement with the decision by the Consti-

tutional Court 11/1992 (III.5.), which declared that, by proclaiming the amendment of the Constitution on 23 

October 1989, practically a new constitution was entered into force, introducing a root-and-branch change by 

giving the state, laws and the political system a completely new character and qualities, and thus making the 

Republic of Hungary an independent and democratic country where the rule of law prevails. The events in 

1989 created a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law. 

What minister of home affairs Horváth István said when proposing the draft law on the election of 

members of the national Parliament in October 1989 is still valid. «Although the new law provides for the 

most democratic solutions, it cannot possibly bring about the desired changes in itself. We must be able to 

actually exercise the freedom and take advantage of the opportunity ensured by the law — and, if ever that 

was important then now it is all the more so, we must not misuse it» [3; 51]. 

The participants of the Roundtable Negotiations created the Hungarian electoral system on the basis of 

the constitutional principle of equal voting rights. 

Election systems have proved to be the most stable of all institutions of representation in democracies, 

and as Lijphart (1994) sums it up the amendments of the systems did not apply to the entire system at hand, 

only to the formulas used and the parliamentary thresholds. It happens rather rarely that the system is re-

formed in its entirety, i.e. bringing about comprehensive and radical reforms. This stability shows the con-

servatism inherent in electoral systems. With the legitimacy of government challenged one is faced with the 

issue of an electoral reform. Together with several other democratised countries, Hungary opted for a mixed 

electoral system during the landmark events of 1989. However, the Hungarian system of 1989 is still unique 

not only because for us, Hungarian it was simple even in its complexity, but also because it is one of the 

most complex systems in the world. Being a three-tier and — two-round system employing even two of the 

available election formulas, it earned itself respect since the system that was designed for a one-off use was 

tried and tested in altogether 6 elections, proving that it was viable and functional. 

The Hungarian electoral system after the changing of the political system 

As a basic political right the right to vote is provided for in the constitution (basic law), whereas the 

procedural and substantive, system-like norms and the election rules are regulated by the Act on the election 

of member of the Parliament and the Act on the electoral procedure respectively, all of them cardinal laws 

today. 

As a basic political law, the right to vote affects the creation of the Hungarian Parliament as well as its 

composition, and «the elections based on universal suffrage give democratic legitimacy to the representative 

and legislator power and indirectly to the governmental power» [4; 172]. The right to vote is linked to two 

major issues regulated by the constitution, to the constitutional regulation of fundamental rights on the one 

hand and of the structure and functioning of the state machinery on the other. The right to vote is, therefore, a 

right to participate, participate in public issues and a key to the legitimacy of representation. 

The regulation of the electoral system, negotiated between 13 June and 18 September 1989 in the 

course of tri-lateral political negotiations, was adopted in a law requiring a two-thirds majority. Amidst con-

ditions of the political transition the participants of the negotiations agreed to come up with a so-called 

mixed and two-round and set the threshold for representation in Parliament at 4 % to ensure governability 

and functionality. The mixed system adopted both by those preparing the (National Roundtable) negotiations 

and by the Members of Parliament was rather complicated since it was trying to combine the advantages of 

majority and proportionate representation systems, i.e. directness and representativity. As intended by its 

makers, the law was designed to serve its purpose a single time. Even though the social and political circum-

stances changed in the meantime, the system was up and running and served altogether six elections. 

It is safe to say that the electoral system set up when the political system changed had two electoral sys-

tems living side by side in it. One of the systems was that of the individual constituencies, with 176 seats to 

win in way that citizens could vote on individuals and the one getting the majority of the votes was made 

Member of Parliament. The other one was the proportionate system where one can vote on party lists and the 

152 mandates were distributed among the parties proportionately with their share of the votes. In addition to 

these two ways to get a seat in Parliament, the remaining 58 seats were filled by people from national party 

lists in line with their share of the fraction votes to strengthen proportionate representation. 

Next we will give an insight into the German electoral system upon which the Hungarian system was 

modelled on when the political system changed. 

The formation of … 

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The German electoral system 

When looking around in the international arena, we must take a close look at the German electoral sys-

tem, which is of great significance not only internationally but also for us, Hungarians since it served as a 

model when the Hungarian system was formed during the National Roundtable negotiations when the social-

ist regime fell apart. 

Classified either a compensation type system or regarded as a class by itself, the German electoral sys-

tem is a so-called personalised proportionate system. It is also classified as a hybrid system working towards 

proportionality, since German citizens cast two votes. The first one is given to an individual candidate in a 

single-member constituency in a simple majority system, while the second one is given to a party list. If the 

number of seats won by a party in a Land exceeds the number of mandates originally allocated to it, i.e. the 

number of party members achieving a relative majority in their own constituency exceeds the number of 

seats originally allocated to the party within the particular Land, then the party may keep such surplus or so-

called overhang seats (Überhangmandate). The other parties are given no compensation for the surplus seats. 

The German electoral law foresees a correction mandate system, since on top of the seats won on a first-past-

the-post basis in the individual constituencies a specific number of correction mandates are also allocated at 

Land level, to work towards a true proportionality of the election results. 

Not unlike Hungary, the electoral system in Germany has undergone some changes as a decree by the 

German Constitutional Court from 2008 ruled that the Electoral Act should be amended to comply with the 

provisions of the German Basic Law. Under the old system it was possible that a vote for a party could back-

fire by turning out to be harmful and no good for the particular party. The system of the so-called surplus 

mandates made it possible for a party to win more seats in the Bundestag than its proportion of the total vote 

would have justified. 

In 2008 the Constitutional Court found it was vital to amend parts of the system in order to ensure that 

election result truly showed the intended political will of the voters underlying their votes cast. The Court 

reckoned that the so-called ‘negative vote value’ put the equality and the direct nature of the elections in 

jeopardy. As a result of negative vote values a party could get more votes than it was justified according to 

their share in the total of the second votes or the other way round. This was due to the fact that in the German 

electoral system Bundestag seats were allocated on the basis on a personal vote for an individual candidate 

and on the basis of a second vote for a party list. The Court argued that the negative vote value did not allow 

each and every vote cast to serve the intentions of the voter, in other words, it could not fully and reassur-

ingly ensure a positive effect on the party preferred and voted by the voters, a breach of the fundamental 

principle of the equality of the elections. 

This amendment of the Electoral Act also resulted in the introduction having so-called compensatory 

mandates, meaning that all the other parties that made it through the parliamentary threshold will be given a 

compensatory seat each if a party wins surplus mandates. The electoral system is thus in full compliance 

with the decree by the German Constitutional Court. Altogether we can conclude that although the German 

system opted for proportionality, both the old and now the new, amended Hungarian electoral law focuses 

rather on compensation. 

Proposals to reform the Hungarian parliamentary system between 1990 and 2011 

From as early as 1990 on a number of proposals have been tabled to amend the Hungarian parliamen-

tary elections system from among which we find the proposals below highly significant. 

 1990–94: Horn Gyula wanted to reduce the number of MPs to about 220–250 persons and the idea of 

a two-chamber assembly was also put forward. Prompted by the criticisms one of the very first reform 

proposals was tabled by the social-democratic SZDSZ, which argued primarily that the Parliament 

oversized and its headcount needed to be cut, therefore Szigethy István of the SZDSZ elaborated a 

distribution system the pivotal point of which was to allocate seats in proportion with the votes given 

to a party on the party lists, thus maintaining the mixed system. In July 1994 the section of the Gov-

ernment programme on electoral reform proposed a one-round system ensuring greater proportional-

ity. Prime Minister Horn was even talking about the possibility of reducing the parliamentary head-

count to 220 to 250 persons and the option of establishing a two-chamber parliament. In spite of such 

plans no major changes were made to the electoral system between 1990 and 1995. Altogether seven 

amendments were adopted including one crucial change raising the threshold from 4 to 5 %; 

M.Horváth, М.Freshly 

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 1994–98: This period also saw suggestions to reduce the number of MPs. Already at this stage Fidesz 

was proposing a radical reduction of the headcount to 220 to 250 persons. The Socialists were propos-

ing to keep the mixed system while reducing the headcount, whereas the Social Democrats wanted to 

reduce the headcount while ensuring proportionality. Although in December 1998 Fidesz tabled a 

proposed amendment to the law and initiated a reduction in the headcount, the parties, however, failed 

to reach a consensus; 

 the Government’s programme of 1998 included a proposal to establish a smaller and more efficient 

Parliament. A six-party parliamentary committee was set up to elaborate the details (to adopt a new 

system, the minimum of a five-party consensus was needed) but this plan was, however, rather short-

lived; 

 2004: Medgyessy Péter also wanted to reduce the number of MPs from 386 to 250 persons. At this 

stage they wanted to amend the electoral system as well since it would not have been possible to re-

duce the size of the Parliament without reforming the electoral system at the same time. This latter 

proposal foresaw a one-round, relative majority system; 

 2006–09: Several suggestions were made to reform the system but none of them was supported by the 

Parliament. 

Even though a number of other suggestions were put forward in the past 20 years to amend the electoral 

system in addition to the proposals above, the system per se remained unchanged in its most important fea-

tures. One of the key issues such proposals were focusing on was the parliamentary headcount. Although 

most opinions on this tended to include the proposal to reduce the headcount on grounds of efficiency and 

cost-cutting, not very many feasibility and impact studies were published and governments continued to be 

formed from 1990 on without a hitch in the electoral system elaborated when the political system was 

changed. Analysing headcount issues in a European context and on the basis of data from all over Europe, 

Rózsa concluded in 1999 that the Hungarian Parliament counts as a large one in Europe; its headcount even 

renders it the largest among countries with a similar sized population, but nonetheless not so large that it 

would be an absolute necessity to reduce it [5; 4, 5]. 

In addition to the points above we can conclude that during the discussions concerning the reform of an 

electoral system the problem often pointed out by experts, namely the disproportionate size of the individual 

constituencies was not given due attention. Ever since their establishment the differences in the dispropor-

tionate size of the constituencies grew up to two or even three times, which, due the demographic changes 

that took place since, triggered further disproportionalities. In democratic systems such anomalies are nor-

mally corrected after the forthcoming ten-year census. 

What logically follows from this is that in the period preceding the two-thirds victory of the FIDESZ-

KDNP coalition in 2000 the parties failed to come to an agreement on the electoral reform, which was 

probably due partly to the fact that the old system was negotiated before it was set up and partly to its rela-

tively balanced nature and the democratic values achieved and acknowledged in the mixed system. Also, in 

spite of the errors inherent in the system and analysed to death it was still able to ensure a balanced govern-

ability and proportionate representation. In 2006 Dezső listed its democratic values by pointing out features 

like a) the single-member constituency system as the form ensuring contact between voters and their elected 

representatives, b) ensuring governability by designating a dominant party through the majority hand in the 

system and c) achieving representativity by party-list compensation mandates [6; 55]. 

The applicable Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of the Members of Parliament 

If you want to outline the preceding history leading up to the act then one has to mention the events as 

follows. Since it made its way back to power in 2010, FIDESZ was throwing the idea of a new electoral law 

in the public mind time and time again and was doing so with reference to a number of the law’s compo-

nents. The other parliamentary parties have also been dealing with proposing a new law providing for the 

rules of parliamentary elections and chaired by Salamon László (KDNP), a parliamentary sub-committee 

was set up to reconcile the various ideas. 

In their earlier drafts the Fidesz-KDNP coalition was advocating the mixed system while both the so-

cialist MSZP and the right-wing Jobbik was favouring the introduction of a proportionate — party-list 

based — electorate system. The draft laws proposed by the Fidesz-KDNP and the MSZP were downright 

contradicting one another, since FIDESZ-KDNP wished to maintain the existing mixed system whereas 

would have preferred a purely list-based system. 

The formation of … 

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As proposed by the draft law tabled by Fidesz-KDNP on 17 May 2010 on the election of the Members 

of Parliament (proposed by Kósa Lajos, Navracsics Tibor, Répássy Róbert, Rétvári Bence, Parliamentary 

document T/18.) the mixed electoral system would have been maintained with the modification, however, 

that the regional lists would be cancelled and citizens could vote on national party lists instead. They calcu-

lated with a Parliament of 198 members, plus 13 minority mandates. Out of the 198 members 90 was sup-

posed to be elected in single-member constituencies, 78 from a national party list, and fragment votes would 

have allocated another 30 mandates. The law, however, was designed in terms of a one-round system and 

would have opted for a relative majority in the individual constituencies, while maintaining the parliamen-

tary threshold, of course. Along with other analysts Szigeti reckons that «… the proposal unveiled rather un-

expectedly … can be seen as generous towards other political players, and by setting up a parliamentary sub-

committee to prepare the electoral reform to reduce the number of MPs it created a forum for political nego-

tiations and reconciliation» [7; 53] 

Tabled also on 17 May 2010 the MSZP’s draft law proposed a reduction to 199 MPs including 176 

Members elected from regional — county and Budapest capital — lists and 23 from a national list to award 

mandates by totalling fragment mandates. In the one-round system proposed the parliamentary threshold 

would have been 5 %. 

This seems the right place to make reference to the Polish system, which is designed in a way similar to 

the MSZP’s proposal. After the Electoral Act of 1991 was amended, the majority of the mandates (391) are 

allocated to regional lists and 69 seats can be won on a national list. In 2001 they chose to do away with the 

national list, and now 7 to 14 mandates can be won in each of the 41 constituencies. Polish citizens can vote 

for this list but in addition they also have a so-called preferential vote which means voters can indicate a 

name on the list they wish to see in the Sejm. Such preferential votes are taken into account then allocating 

the seats to the persons on the list. 

At the session of the parliamentary sub-committee discussing the reform of the electoral law on 17 Oc-

tober 2011 the parties failed to reach a consensus. Although chairman Salamon László put several proposals 

to the vote, including among others the proposal by the MSZP and one put forward by Lázár János, but none 

of them could reach the necessary majority in the sub-committee working on a partners-at-parity basis. On 

20 November 2011 Lázár János tabled his private member’s bill, which was adopted to create the new Elec-

toral Act foreseeing a new electoral system. 

An electoral system should only be assessed with due consideration to all of its components. One of the 

crucial factors is whether we are dealing with a proportionate, majority or mixed system. An equally essen-

tial question is how the majority and proportionate components complement one another. Duverger's law 

asserts that purely majority rule elections structured within single-member districts, where seats can be won 

with a relative majority, tend to favour a two-party system. (Duverger, 1972) A proportionate, list-based sys-

tem tends to result in a rather fragmented party structure [8; 362]. 

On 6 April 2014 we, Hungarians had the opportunity to experience first-hand that voters could elect 

106 MPs in single-member constituencies and 93 from a national list. The procedure to elect our MPs was 

made one-round only, as part of which voters with domiciled in Hungary could vote for one candidate in a 

single-member constituency and a party list, whereas citizens domiciled in Hungary and listed as belonging 

to a minority could vote for one candidate in a single-member constituency and the minority list. Those eli-

gible to vote in the absence of a domicile in Hungary, i.e. ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary 

could vote for a party list only. 

When the new act was adopted the boundaries of the constituencies were also re-drawn. When the draft 

law was put forward it was argued that the re-drawing of the constituency boundaries was made necessary by 

the Constitutional Court Decree of 2005, which was designed to ensure that the boundaries of single-member 

constituencies do not cross the boundaries of counties of that of the capital, that such districts should form a 

single coherent area and lastly, that the number of those eligible to vote should be roughly the same. The new 

single-member constituencies, therefore do not cross county boundaries, which logically followed from the 

old electoral law with county lists, thus making counties an electoral unit. In the new system, however, 

county lists have been eliminated to give way to one single national list instead. 

The new Act allows a divergence in the size of the constituencies exceeding 15 % of those eligible to 

vote only if the divergence cannot be maintained for objective reasons, be it what may, say migration, for 

instance. Changing constituency boundaries is made mandatory for the Parliament when, for whatever rea-

son, such divergence exceeds 20 %. The Act created 18 and 12 single-member constituencies in Budapest 

and in county Pest respectively. In the remaining countries 2 to 7 single-member constituencies were estab-

lished in proportion with the number of those eligible to vote. 

M.Horváth, М.Freshly 

82 

Вестник Карагандинского университета 

Prior to the adoption of the new Act the boundaries of the constituencies were still regulated by a Coun-

cil of Ministers’ Decree from 1990 adopted by Németh Miklós Government. (Council of Ministers’ Decree 

2/1990. (I.11.) on the establishing of the boundaries of single-member constituencies and regional electoral 

districts) Drawing the boundaries of constituencies has always been a rather thorny issue due to the manipu-

lation of the district boundaries, known as gerrymandering. Coming from US English, the political term des-

ignates the practice of manipulating district boundaries to gain political advantage. Governor of Massachu-

setts Elbridge Gerry signed a bill in 1812 to change the boundaries of electoral districts, favouring his own 

party, hence the term. 

The number of recommendations needed for a candidate in the first place doubled under the new regu-

lation, saying that the area of the individual districts, and therefore the number the eligible voters also in-

creased. A candidate, consequently, needs at least 1500 recommendations from eligible voters listed in the 

particular single-member constituency. By law a voter may recommend only one candidate but may do so 

only in the case of candidates in his/her own constituency, although there is no way to check who gives how 

many recommendations to whom. 

Fragment votes and over-compensation 

Under the old Electoral Act of 1989 those eligible could vote for individual candidates and regional lists 

but not for a national list, since it was used to collect fragment votes only. Under the new Act the two lists 

were merged since the number of MPs was reduced from 386 to 199. The methods employed to allocate 

compensation seats and mandates from the lists are as follows. To begin with, any vote that failed to result in 

a mandate in a single-member constituency is automatically transferred to the national party list, saying that 

the number of single-member districts had been reduced. Also, the winner, too, gets fragment votes after the 

ones that did not result in a mandate, on the grounds that this is not unprecedented in the international arena, 

take Italy for instance. This, however, can lead to overcompensation. The winner in a single-member con-

stituency does not use all of the votes that had been cast for him/her but a single vote over the number of 

votes the second candidate was given to use the thus outstanding votes once again as fragment votes. As 

pointed out by analysts, this became the disproportionality factor of the new system, raising a number of fur-

ther issues. One of the most significant of these is certainly the question whether or not a vote cast for the 

winner in a single-member constituency resulted in one or more than one mandates. 

The system’s tendency to lean towards disproportionality is particularly striking as looking at turnout 

rates and votes we can conclude that 55 % of all voters in all of the votes voted for candidates other than the 

FIDESZ-KDNP one and yet, the FIDESZ-KDNP could achieve a two-thirds victory with this 45 % vote rate. 

Data seems to suggest that a relatively small election difference can result in an overwhelming victory. 

Votes by ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary  

and the representation of minorities in the Hungarian Parliament 

Another new element in the Act is votes by ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary. It seems 

justified to underline the representation of minorities in Hungary, which, in the argumentation of the law, is 

necessary as ‘The currently applicable electoral rules fellow Hungarians living outside the borders of Hun-

gary do not have the right to vote in Hungarian parliamentary elections and the parliamentary representation 

of minorities in Hungary is also a problem to be remedied’. (Parliamentary document T/5006:99) 

One of the exception rules in the Basic Law allows Hungarian citizens domiciled abroad to vote for 

party lists only, which may pose problems from the aspect of international law since this violates the princi-

ple of equal votes as provided for both by the European Convention of Human rights and the UN Interna-

tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When a country gives a person the right to vote, this cannot be 

restricted, i.e. a half vote. There is no legal obligation to give the right to vote to Hungarians citizens domi-

ciled outside the borders of Hungary, but if Hungary chooses to do so, she can give a full right only. In the 

case of the Hungarian citizens domiciled elsewhere a sound argument against their voting rights can be that 

the right to vote should be given to those only who will be bearing the consequences of thereof. The Hungar-

ian Basic Law argues that such voting right are justified because these people are Hungarian citizens and can 

return to their mother country at any time, which would make them decision-makers. Knowing how things 

are these days in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing Hungarians domiciled outside the borders of Hungary 

vote for individual candidates would be bound to provoke the fury of neighbouring countries since this 

would tantamount to establishing electoral districts within their jurisdiction. 

The formation of … 

Серия «Филология». № 2(82)/2016 

83 

The way votes cast by citizens domiciled outside the borders are calculated varies from country to 

country, Poland, for example, adds such votes to a district in Warsaw but a half-vote system is clearly un-

precedented. 

The new Electoral Act provides also for the representation of minorities. The respective national minor-

ity self-government may compile a minority list only. To make it to this list candidates need the recommen-

dation of at least 1 % of the persons listed as a minority citizen, which is capped at 1500 recommendations. 

The Act guarantees minorities one eased mandate each, which reduces the number of mandates on the 

national list. Another novelty element in the new Act is the institution of the minority spokesperson, should 

the minority fail to win a seat for whatever reason, thus guaranteeing the opportunity for minorities to par-

ticipate in the Parliament’s work. 

Summary 

Starting out from the relationship between representative and direct democracy, this study provides a 

brief overview of the Hungarian electoral system as it was formed when the political system was changed in 

1989, outlines its history ever since, and whilst also offering a comparison with the Polish and the German 

systems as two examples of electoral systems in Europe, it focuses primarily on the regulatory aspects of the 

electoral system, knowing fully well and bearing in mind that the most important instrument of renewing a 

representative democracy is free parliamentary elections. 

 

 

References 

 

1  Bihari M. Demokrácia, képviselet és választási rendszer. A választási rendszer funkciói / Szerk. M.Dezső, I.Kukorelli  

Választástudományi tanulmányok, Választási füzetek 59. Választási stúdiumok. — 1999. — 2. szerk. — P. 7–19. 

2  Kukorelli I. Húsz éve alkotmányozunk // Közjogi Szemle. — 2009. —3 szám. — P. 1–10. 

3  Horváth I. Az országgyűlési képviselők és a köztársasági elnök választásáról szóló törvényjavaslat // Magyar Jog. — 

1989. —12 szám. — P. 1046–1051. 

4  Dezső M. Képviselet és választás a parlamenti jogba // Jog és jogtudomány. Sorozat Közgazdasági és Jogi. — 1998. —

15 szám. — 210 p. 

5  Rózsa P. Parlamenti létszámtan (Parliamentary Headcounts) // Beszélő. — 1999. — 7–8 szám. — P. 2–4. 

6  Dezső M. Választási rendszer — választójog // Fundamentum. — 2006. — 3 szám. — P. .55–58. 

7  Szigeti P., Szoboszlai G., Kovács L., Hegedűs D., Unger A., Magyar K., László R., Győri G. Az új választási rendszer 

kilátásai // Fundamentum. — 2010. — 4. szám. — P. 53–84.  

8  Moser R. Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Post Communist States // World Politics. — 1999. — Vol. 51. — 

P. 359–384. 

 

 

М.Хорват, М.Фрешли  

Венгрияда сайлау өткізуде электоралды мəдениетті қалыптастыру 

Мақала  Венгрияда  парламенттік  сайлау  өткізудің  мəдениетін  қалыптастыруды  зерттеуге  арналған. 

Авторлар  еуропалық  сайлау  жүйесінің  тəжірибелерін  (Польша,  Германия)  қарастырып,  саяси 

төңкерістен  кейінгі  венгерлік  сайлау  жүйесін  талдады.  Электораттың  саяси  мəдениетін  бұқаралық 

ақпарат құралдары арқылы көтеру қажеттілігін дəлелдеді. 

 

М.Хорват, М.Фрешли  

Формирование электоральной культуры в Венгрии 

Статья  посвящена  изучению  формирования  культуры  парламентских  выборов  в  Венгрии.  Авторами 

обобщен опыт европейских избирательных систем (Польша, Германия), проанализирована специфика 

венгерской избирательной системы после политического переворота. Доказана необходимость повы-

шения политической культуры электората, в том числе через средства массовой информации. 

 

 

84 

Вестник Карагандинского университета 

АВТОРЛАР  ТУРАЛЫ  МƏЛІМЕТТЕР 

СВЕДЕНИЯ  ОБ  АВТОРАХ 

INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS  

Asan, A.K.

 — 

Undergraduate, L.N.Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana

. 

 

Asanov, K.D

. — 

Doctor of Philology, Professor, Ye. A. Buketov Karaganda State University

.

 

Bona, E. 

— 

Master of Science in Philologie in Russian Language and Literature, Eötvös Loránd University, 

Budapest, Hungary. 

Freshly, М.

 — 

Doctor of PhD, Assotiate professor, Western Hungarian University, Szombathely, Hungary. 

Gyöngyösi, М.

 — 

PhD, Doctor of Philology, habil., Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest, Hungary. 

Horvath, M.

 — 

PhD student, Western Hungarian University, Doctoral School of Law and Political Scienc-

es, Szombathely, Hungary

.

 

Karenov, R.S.

 — 

Doctor of Economy, Professor,

 

Ye.A.Buketov Karaganda State University.  

Khassenov, B.

 — 

Master of Philology, Ye.A.Buketov Karaganda State University. 

Khassenova, Zh.

 — 

Student of the filological faculty, Ye.A.Buketov Karaganda State University

. 

 

Kurmataeva, A.E. 

— 

Master, Tutor, A.Myrzakhmetov Kokshetau University

. 

 

Kuznetcova, T.D.

  — 

Professor, Candidate of Psychological Science, Ablaikhan Kazakh University of 

International Relations and World Languages, Almaty. 

Nurpeis, D.N.

 — 

Tutor, A.Myrzakhmetov Kokshetau University

. 

 

Rakhmetullina, M.A. 

— 

Senior teacher, Ye.A.Buketov Karaganda State University

. 

Smagulov, Zh.K. 

— 

Doctor of Philology, Professor of Kazakh Literary department, Ye.A.Buketov 

Karaganda State University. 

Smakova, T.S.

 — 

Undergraduate, Ye.A. Buketov Karaganda State University

.

 

Sundetuly, K. 

— 

Candidate of historical sciences, Head of research center named by Z.Kabdolov, 

Kh.Dosmukhamedov Atyrau State University. 

Umutculova, A.N.

 — 

Undergraduate, Ablaikhan Kazakh University of International Relations and World 

Languages, Almaty. 

Zhanuzakov, N.B. 

— 

Master of Pedagogics sciences, Teacher of foreign languages, Ye.A.Buketov Kara-

ganda State University. 

Zhetibayuly, U. 

— 

Professor, Ili Pedagogical University, China. 

Zhunussova, A.K.

  — 

Master of Philology, Senior teacher, Karaganda Economic University of 

Kazpotrebsouz.