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НАУЧНО-ПРАКТИЧЕСКАЯ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ «30-ЛЕТИЕ НЕЗАВИСИМОСТИ КАЗАХСТАНА
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| НАУЧНО-ПРАКТИЧЕСКАЯ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ «30-ЛЕТИЕ НЕЗАВИСИМОСТИ КАЗАХСТАНА:
ДОСТИЖЕНИЯ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ» Security measures, possibly related to military options, are recognized as part of supply security policy, especially in the United States. It has often been argued that military spending and periodic hostilities are prerequisites for a steady flow of, and, access to, Middle East oil. Since the 9/11 attacks, energy importers have become increasingly aware of the vulnerability of energy infrastructure. The United States has taken the most comprehensive measures in terms of protecting its energy infrastructure. Government views on the energy as one of the most important sectors of infrastructure. Russia and Iran won for the most part in terms of ensuring their security because of the signing of the "Aktau Convention", while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan won more in terms of oil and gas. In the future, with such a gain, it will be very difficult to look from the outside at the successes and profits of other countries, which is to a certain extent a problem, perhaps even of a regional nature. And even taking into account the possible gain in certain issues, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the very fact speaks of a high probability that the “losers” parties will want to revise the conditions - and as the history of such treaties and agreements with a complex history of signing shows, it is possible that they will not once. John Stewart, Director of Policy and Research, Canadian Nuclear Association supposed that when oil demand in China weakened in January because of the COVID epidemic, a production entente between the Saudi Arabia and Russia broke down, and so the Saudis increased supply in February, hoping to drive some high-priced production out of the market. That decision collided in early March with about a 15% drop in global oil demand, as people stayed home worldwide, and airlines and businesses rapidly shut down. The price of oil fell suddenly by at least half. This has had dramatic fiscal effects in oil-producing countries and regions, some of which need far higher oil prices than the current $20 or so to balance their budgets. [6]. Most likely, this can manifest itself rather cautiously, but even a small disagreement can lead to another and subsequent negotiations, in which countries that are at least 1% losers will have a chance to somehow influence the improvement of their country's situation on the world energy market and not only. The Aktau agreement cannot be regarded as closed event - after all, if you put it on the “mosaic of the world process”, it becomes clear that this agreement is a forced measure - concluded on the principle “a bad peace is better than a good quarrel”. Russia understands that the fight with the West is for a long time, and it is better to agree on the Caspian than to leave this issue as a "trump card" against them. In addition, there is a gas competition with the United States for Europe, and it is better to let a “junior partner” in the person of Azerbaijan or another post-Soviet republic enter the market than compete with other, larger players. Iran, which also agreed to the terms, simply cannot waste its energy on the Caspian. Tensions with the United States, balancing almost on the brink of open confrontation with Israel. There is simply no money in Tehran. If now there was a time, as in the middle of the 2000s, then Iran would have become more active long ago and such conditions would not suit it. One of the possible development scenarios may be as follows. The signed agreement, likely, is a forced measure, but as soon as Iran gets stronger and internal strife ends in Syria, Tehran will again remember that Baku and Ashgabat "have no right to the current borders." In this case, this problem will not affect Russia and Kazakhstan, because these countries have established their own sea borders between them. However, all experts agree that the rehabilitation of Iranian oil can provoke a new round of tension not only in this part of the Caspian Sea, but also in the entire region. It is worth noting here that Russia has previously openly warned the West about the possibility of using force to prevent the implementation of pipeline projects across the Caspian Sea. But she could not find allies in this matter. Even Kazakhstan, which not long ago spoke about the nebulousness of the prospects for a large pipe from Turkmenistan to Europe, is now declaring that it can join it "from above" by extending its own gas pipeline from Aktau to Baku. жүктеу/скачать 3,05 Mb. Достарыңызбен бөлісу:
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