Gender Mean Stand. deviation Mode Women
Regarding the type of training already conducted by the company 94% of trainings are directed to
marketing learning and everything related to sales. Also 83% of respondents had trainings on technical
skills learning that includes directions for new equipment use. Only one employee had an opportunity to
improve his computer literacy especially learning new computer programs and others in order to fulfill his
projects. And what is interesting about the last the one who is curious about new programs is woman in the
“55 years and more” age category.
Concerning the period of time employees are participating in trainings answers were classified in
categories of working hours and after working hours, payable and non payable trainings. 83% of 18
respondents prefer to have trainings at working hours and these hours considered to be payable, 11% of
employees have to give up working hours payments for trainings. This scarce percentage is remarkably
noticeable as those employees are working in the company less than 1 year. And only 6% had training
programs after working hours.
Employee expectations and perceptions were examined in terms of general fields they want to be
developed in following 2 years. As a result, half of the respondents surely want to improve communication
skills and demand for foreign language learning is also the most. In particular, regarding our survey, the
results indicate that improving professional skills in such trainings as sales management, marketing, stress
management, leadership development has a meaningful part (33%) (Figure1).
Figure 1 - Employee expectations about training program (in percentage)
However, there are some respondents interested in developing public speaking skills (16,67%) and
programming (11,1.%). Despite the fact that the results provide small number interested in programming
and public speaking skills, the age category is unbelievably fluctuating from 16 to 45 years old that means
people are concerned not only about doing routine work but also developing their own potential,
overcoming new challenges and as a result get successful point, self-actualization.
In conclusion, it is important to mention that the sample size of this research work might not be able
to reflect completely employee training and development situation in every enterprise of Kazakhstan. The
study provides interesting insights on the employee attitude to trainings, as the results show the actuality
of the question in small and medium enterprises in Kazakhstan. Generally, managers of the company in
the purpose of increasing the qualification share their experience with employees, finding other ways to
train as well as human resource specialists and specialists from outside. However there is still much to
concern about trainings and skills development, improving the systematic character and offering
employees what they really want and need. I should like to emphasize that significant part of respondents
are interested in developing more professional skills such as communication skills, leadership
development, stress management and time management rather than personal preferences.
The study identified that women have more positive perceptions of the quality of training conducted
in their company rather than men. In general terms, women tend to answer more positively (‘agree”),
men’s view are more critical and a little bit negative which we have observed by answers which they gave.
A similar study may be conducted to compare the results in other organizations in order to build the
whole picture of employee training and development in enterprises of Kazakhstan.
Cayer N. J., Cook S. Handbook of training and development for the public sector: a
comprehensive resource. – San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993.
Flippo E.B. Principles of Personnel Management. - Virginia: McGraw-Hill Series in
Mathis R. L., Jackson J. H. Using Human Resources, Advisor on the Web. – South-Western
Pedlar A. Applying self-development in organizations, 1995, in Mabey C., Iles P. Managing
Learning. – London: Routledge in association with the Open University, 1995.
Baum M. Applying self-development in organizations, 1995, in Mabey C., Iles P. Managing
Learning. – London: Routledge in association with the Open University, 1995.
Harrison R. Learning and Development. – CIPD Publishing, 2005.
Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 15 May 2007 No. 25"Kazakhstan Pravda" as of 22
May 2007 No. 76 (25321)
Julie Bos Maximize Every Training Dollar. Workforce Management, Vol. 17, Iss.39, 2008.
УДК 323.1; 327.39
POSSIBLE ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE ATTACK AGAINST IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM R. Saidullayev Scientific Supervisor Prof. Zhuldyz Tulibayeva Suleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Economics Özet Bu makale İran'ın nükleer sektöründeki en son gelişmeler ve İsrail tarafında İran nükleer krize olası
bir askeri çözüm ile ilgili tepkiyle aid bir analizini sunmaktadır. İsrail tarafından yapılabilir savaşın olası
senaryo, İran'ın nükleer tesislerine karşı önleyici grevin siyasi ve askeri etkilerin açıklar. İsrail ABD'nin
desteği olmadan bir askeri operasyon başlamaz ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri İsraile izin vermez. Tabii
ki, bu İsrail önleyici saldırı kuvvetle şüpheli unutulmamalıdır. Ama, benim amacım İsrail tarafından
hazırlanmış savaşın olası senaryoların açıklamaktır.
Annotation This article contains the analyses of reaction and position of Israel government regarding recent
Iranian achievements in nuclear industry and probable military solution of Iranian nuclear crisis by Israel.
Explains the possible war scenarios that could be carried out by Israel; political and military consequences
of the preventive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Of course, it should be noted that Israeli preventive
attack is greatly doubtful, because it will not start military operation without backing U.S., and the USA
will not allow Israel to attack Iran due to consequences that hurts US interests, but nevertheless, my aim is
to explain the possible war scenarios that are already prepared by Israel.
Түйін Бұл мақала Израил өкіметінің Иран ядролық бағдарламасындағы соңғы жетістіктеріне қатысты
реакциясы мен саяси ұстанымына және де Иранның ядролық дағдарысын Израил тарапынын
әскери тәсілмен шешу жолдарына талдау жасайды. Мүмкін болатын соғыс сценарийлеріне, және
Израил өкіметінің адын алу шарасымен жасайтын шабуылының кейбір саяси және әскери
салдарларына түсіндірме жасайды. Әрине, айта кетер жайт, Израил Америка Құрама Штаттарының
тікелей қолдауынсыз алдын алу мақсатымен Иранға шабуылдауы екіталай, ал бұған АҚШ рұқсат
бермейді де, себебі бұл шабуылдың салдарлары АҚШ-тың мудделеріне тікелей зардап әкеледі.
Бірақ менің мақсатым Израиль тарапынан әлде қашан дайындалып қойылған мүмкін болатын
соғыс сценарийлерін түсіндіру.
Аннотация В статье представлен анализ реакции и позиции Израильского правительства в отношении
последних достижений в иранской атомной промышленности и вероятного военного решения
иранского ядерного кризиса со стороны Израиля. Объясняет возможные сценарии войны, которая
может быть проведена Израилем; политические и военные последствия превентивного удара по
иранским ядерным объектам. Конечно, следует отметить, что Израильские превентивные атаки
сильно сомнительны, потому что Израиль не начнет военную операцию без поддержки США, и
США не позволят Израилю напасть на Иран в связи с последствиями, которые повредят интересам
США. Но, тем не менее, моя цель состоит в объяснении возможных сценарии войны, которые уже
Keywords: Iran, Nuclear Weapons, Israel, Preventive Attack.
Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most debated states in contemporary international relations, due
to its nuclear program and current regime. Tensions between Islamic Republic of Iran on the one side and
USA and Israel on the other side reached its peak. They are even on the threshold of the war. And in
addition Iranian efforts to obtain atomic bomb capability are mostly pressing nuclear proliferation threat
today. Unlike North Korea, which has already built nuclear weapons, Iran may be a few years away from
being able to produce enough fissile material for atomic bomb. In this paper I will try explain position and
reaction of Israel regarding recent Iranian achievements in nuclear development program. And of course,
military options as a last resort to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions in case if all peaceful
options will be exhausted.
• Israel’s National Security Doctrine:
This is based on the perception that Arab countries are determined to destroy Israel; that Israel has no
reliable allies and must take care of itself; there is an asymmetrical balance of resources versus the Arab
countries in Demography, Economic Resources, Structure of Armed Forces in terms of man power.
• Israel’s Operational Military Doctrine:
That Israel must have the capability to deter any possible Arab attack, and if deterrence fails then
Israel must strive for an early war termination if war breaks out. That any war with the Arab countries
would have to be short and decisive. That the war must quickly be carried into and fought on Arab
territory giving rise to a rapid offensive an high degree of mobility to sustain continuous forward
• Israel’s Nuclear Policy:
A nuclear capability is needed to deter threats to Israel’s existence. The possible acquisition of
nuclear weapons by any Arab or non-Arab Muslim State in the region is considered as a direct existential
threat to Israel. Israel should prevent all States in the Middle East Region from developing a nuclear
program that it sees as a threat, or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel has deliberately
maintained a nuclear policy ambiguity about its own nuclear weapons program.
From points above we can make interference that Israel always feels existential threat. Because in its
six decade existence Israel faced six full-scale wars with its Arab neighbors: 1948-49 War of
Independence; 1956 Sinai Campaign; 1976 war; 1969-70 War on Attrition; 1973 war; 1982 Lebanon war.
Due to Nuclear and Biological threat in spring 1981 Israel sent the Israel Air Force (IAF) to destroy Iraq’s
Osirak nuclear facility. On September 6, 2007 Israel Air Force attacked nuclear reactor in the Deir ez-Zor
region of Syria which is known as an “Operation Orchard”. By referring to 3 points above Israel will make
great attempts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Some Israeli officials say: “If the U.S.
strategy in 2013 doesn’t produce noticeable changes in Iran’s behavior, then either Israel will convince the
U.S to strike or they will go it alone”. In contrast Security expert Zbigniew Brzezinski: “We do not need to
go to war, and have to make it clear to our Israeli friends. We are not going to war; they are not going to
go to war by flying over our airspace over Iraq. We are not going to support them. If they do it, they will
be on their own. The consequences will be theirs, because the price we will pay, based on massive war,
which the Iranians interpret as being done with our connivance, will be disastrous for us in Afghanistan, in
Iraq, in terms of oil, but also in the Middle East more generally”. It is great doubtful that Israel will go to
war with Iran without backing the USA. But nevertheless let’s consider possible war scenarios of Israeli
pre-emptive attack on Iran. We should notice that Israel has enough experience in such operations (IAF
attack on Iraqi Osirak and Syrian Deir ez-Zor reactors). But we cannot compare Iraq and Syria with Iran in
terms of Military potential, man power and strategic leverages. And it would be problematic for Israel to
attack Iran’s objects due to distance, number of targets and nature of those targets.
Main targets of Israel:
These are main facilities that are vital in Iranian Nuclear infrastructure which can stop or at least
delay the program for several years:
Plutonium Production Nuclear Reactor:
Arak: Heavy Water Plant and future plutonium production center
Nuclear Fuel cycle:
Natanz: Uranium enrichment facility
Esfahan: Uranium Conversion facility. Nuclear Research Center.
Israel created two war scenarios. Scenario I is through Air Force attack and Scenario II is through
Ballistic Missile Attack.
Scenario I: Israel Air Force strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities and Ballistic Missile Sites.
In past years Israel decreased the number of its Air force, but made some technological advance and
increased their qualities which are:
• First of all detecting then tracking and engage mobile
• Rapidly destroying advanced air defense system.
• Long range operation over horizon by gathering intelligence information.
• Perform deep strike mission with aircraft like F-16I/F-15I
These elements below are the main requirements for modern fighting force:
• Air to Air weapons
• Air to Ground weapons
• High operational readiness
• Ballistic Missile Defense/ Integrated Air Defense System
• Ground Launched Intercepts/ Quick Response time
• All Weather Day Night operational capability
By considering qualities and requirements above some experts from Center for Strategic International
Studies like Abdullah Toukhan and Anthony Cordesman says that Israeli Air Force is Greatly Superior
from Iranian Airforce (Iranian Air force outdated and dates back to 1970’s).
In recent years Israeli Air Force acquired about 125 F-16I and F-15I warplanes, equipped with Israeli
avionics and additional fuel tanks – tailor made for long-distance strike missions. In addition Israel
purchased special bunker-buster bombs; long endurance, unmanned aircraft, and most of its trainings
mainly focused on long-range missions.
In order to start operation Israel needs to shorten the distance between them as short as possible,
because it’s very long way from Israel to Iran. According to approximation many of potential targets are
between 930 miles to 1200 miles from Israeli Air bases. Israeli Air Force have to get Iran by the same time
There are 3 main roots are possible:
Northern route: along the borders between Syria and Turkey, then Turkey and Iraq
Central Route: more likely root over Iraq, without U.S. assistance Iraqi authorities far less able to
monitor and control their air space, opening doors to Israel’s incursion.
Southern Route: over Saudi air space. We are not sure would Saudis give permission to fly in its air
space to Israeli warplanes or not.
Israel can use its EW (electronic warfare) as it used during raid on Syrian nuclear facility, where
Israeli F-15 and F-16s flew over Syrian territory without being detected by Syrian air defense radars.
(Network Attack System).
Technological capability allows Israel to hack and invade communication networks of enemy by
manipulating the sensors of enemy into the positions that approaching aircraft cannot be seen. This process
involve locating enemy’s emitters then sending false targets and cause algorithms with the aim to take
control over the system. In the Electronic Warfare environment even if Turkey will detect these aerial
activities it might think that this aircraft is friendly and is not flying over their territory. Though Syria
would be hoaxed to believe there is no threat over its territory. It should be noted that Syria’s major
Airbases are not close to Northern borders and stationed MiG-21 aircraft are for training. On the last part
of flight, when there small distance left to Iranian border they could fly over Turkish territory or Northern
borders of Iraq. This flight route could be an ideal for Israeli aircraft to make an aerial refueling from
tankers on entrance and withdrawal from Iran. This route over Syrian Northern borders could result to low
political risks with Syria, with which Israel hasn’t signed any Peace Treaty or even haven’t hold formal
negotiation. If Israeli F-15’s and F-16’s will fly over Turkish territory it could be perceived as Israel and
Turkey or US’s conspiracy attack on Islamic Republic of Iran, therefore political risks could be high with
Turkey. If we make estimation on operational basis, the risk from Syria could be low, though the risk
from Turkish side could be on medium level if Turkey considers reacting militarily.
In October, 1994 Israel signed Peace Treaty with Jordan, for that reason Israel have to inform Jordan
about planned flights over Jordanian territory. According to suggestions of CSIS experts Jordan will not
allow Israel to fly over Jordan airspace to strike IRI. Violating Jordan airspace will put in risk Peace
Treaty which could possess high political risks for Israel. So, this flight over Jordan territory could be
detected and disabled by Jordan side, as a result whole region will be informed. Israel could meet
operational risks because of interception of Israeli aircraft by Jordan airforce. This could break up whole
mission. So, Central route through Jordan-Syrian border would possess High political risks and high
operational risks. Iraqi side also will try to not to allow violate its air space, with the US help to Iraq this
flights would be detected and Israel would have to refuse to fly through Iraq.
Israel could use the route which it used in June 1991, strike of Iraqi Osirak Nuclear reactor, flying
through Jordan→ Saudi-Arabia→ Iraq or Kuwait. Politically United States will not allow Israel to take
such big risks which will hurt US-Saudi strategic relationship. Both Iraq and Kuwait will not allow to
Israel to violate its airspace. So, this route would posses high political risks, but operational risks could be
According to estimations implementation of air to ground strike mission can be difficult and would
engage some risks. Flying from very tight route, Turkish-Syrian borders, along the way refueling without
being detected by Syria, Turkey, and also flying throughout Iranian territory without being detected by
flying very low and applying Electronic Counter Measures all the way. In case if detected by Iran’s air
defense system, be prepared to encounter the interceptors and firing of ground based Shuttle Attachment
If Israel would use Ballistic Missiles to fulfill the mission, it has a huge capability, while Iran doesn’t
have a Ballistic Missiles Defense System so far, like Russian S-300 PMU2 “Favorit” and S-400 which
were created to catch ballistic missiles and aircraft. Iran had negotiated with Russia to purchase air defense
system S-300 PMU2, but unsuccessful.
Israeli Pre-emptive attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: Political and Military consequences:
Iran’s nuclear program:
The more Israel will threat to the survival of Iranian regime, the more Iran will want to acquire
nuclear bomb. Iran in a long term period will decide to create nuclear deterrent shield. This would mean
not the ending but beginning of such program with clear military dimension. Iran might start an expedited
program in developing its own atomic bomb. In addition, Iran would covert its dispersed facilities into full
scale weapon building program and reach results in a short terms.
IAEA and Iran Iran would stop its membership in Non Proliferation Treaty by insisting that it needs atomic bomb to
deter further aggressions by US and Israel.
Iranian response to Israeli aggression Instant retaliation by using ballistic missiles against Israel, launches Shahab-3, there is a high
possibility that Iran will use chemical, biological and radiological warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli
civilian and military centers, and Israeli nuclear bomb sites.
Iran will also use proxy groups like Hamas or Hezbollah to Israel with unexpected suicide bombings,
covert rocket attacks and chemical, biological and radiological attacks from Southern Lebanon.
Regional Security • Rise of terrorism, conflict and instability in whole Middle Eastern region
• Destabilization of Iraq through Shia groups against U.S. occupation, arming insurgency groups
• Upgrade and support Taliban capabilities in Afghanistan
• Raise of asymmetric attacks against US interests and allies in region, especially against those
countries where US has military bases like Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and etc.
• Target US and Western shipping in the Persian Gulf region, and try to interrupt the oil flow through
• Attack oil infrastructure of GCC countries by interrupting oil supply, which would lead to dramatic
rise in oil prices leading to new long lasting world economic crisis.
• Cause environmental damage: spread of radiation.