Shanghai Cooperation Organization and interests of Russia and China
Saduyeva A.O.
Suleyman Demirel University
Central Asia is a "new" international region. All its components have emerged as independent
states in their present form only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and have relatively short, by
historical standards, state-building experience. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a unique
object of analysis. SCO unites the two largest states in Eurasia – Russia and China, and four Central
Asian states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is not a secret that every member
country of the organization has its own motives and interests. In this paper, I would like to consider the
motives of the two powers - Russia and China.
Key words: Central Asia, cooperation, region, development, security.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established in 2001 on the basis of the "Shanghai
Five", founded after signing, by the heads of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, of
Agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field of the border area and the Agreement
on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. Permanent members are China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Observer statuses in the SCO have Mongolia,
India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In June 2009, at the summit in Yekaterinburg was decided to grant
the status of The SCO Dialogue Partners to Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
The main objectives of the organization are to strengthen stability and security in a wide area
comprising the member-states, the fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking,
development of economic cooperation, energy partnership, scientific and cultural cooperation.
The expert attitudes toward the SCO are different. Some see it as a "military alliance with the anti-
American component directed against NATO", others - as "guarantor of stability" in the region. Military
aspect has played a major role in the Shanghai Treaty of 1996, with the help of which, Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan regulated territorial issues. But over time, the military function
of the SCO increasingly pushed into the background, giving way to "interstate consultation and
cooperation in political, economic and financial sectors, as well as the fight against drug trafficking".
There is a long-standing antagonism between Russia and China, complicating the work of the SCO.
"Russia has a double function in the region. On the one hand, Moscow is playing the role of regional
and organizing power, on the other - increasingly struggling to establish its dominant position in the
field of oil and gas transportation. In addition, Moscow is trying to strengthen regional integration
between Russia and Central Asia and in the struggle for the location of the Central Asian countries come
into direct competition with China, lacking in minerals".
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Prospects for this competitive are unclear.
Chinese interests
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Interregional trade and economy, cultural relations between border regions of China and Central
Asian republics have been restored since the 1980s, in line with the normalization of Sino-Soviet
relations and the adoption of the Chinese leadership, headed by Deng Xiaoping, of the course of
economic reform of the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had established bilateral
relations with all countries of Central Asia in January 1992, thus marked a new stage in its political line
for the region.
Modern priorities and directions of Chinese policy toward Central Asian region are determined as
national security concerns of China, and economic questions as well. The first aspect is explained by
the fact, that the region is closely linked to one of the most problematic administrative and territorial
units of China – Xinjiang. Second – economic, determined by the position of key suppliers of energy
resources in Central Asia, particularly necessary for China in the period of economic development. At
this stage, it is possible to speak not only about the individual aspects of bilateral relations between
China and countries in the region, but also the strategy of China in respect of Central Asia as a single
entity.
China has become a major investor in the region: for the 2001-2011Chinese investments have
increased more than 20 times, reaching more than 20 billion dollars.
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During 20 years, trade between
China and the countries of the region has grown almost 100 times. As stated by the Deputy Minister of
Commerce Jiang Yaopin, if in 1992 the volume of bilateral trade between China and Central Asian
countries was 460 million USD, then by 2012 this figure increased to 46 billion dollars.
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China and
countries in the region have raised the format of bilateral cooperation to a "strategic partnership."
Economic activity of China on Central Asian line is related, firstly, to Beijing’s ambition to expand the
access to regional energy resources, because the maintaining high growth of Chinese economy forces it
to diversify an import of hydrocarbons including the Central Asian countries. China's achievements in
this direction can be regarded as launching the oil pipeline "Kazakhstan - China" (2005) and the gas
pipeline "Central Asia - China" (2009), which linked western China and the Central Asian region by
energy arteries.
China is showing serious interest in the development and reform in Central Asia transport and
communication infrastructure, which allows, on the one hand, to optimize the costs of delivery of
Chinese goods and ensure the safety of their transportation, and on the other - to fasten the development
of the western region in China. Among other things due to Chinese investment Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam
and Bishkek-Torugart (Kyrgyzstan) were rehabilitated, tunnels Shahristan, Chormagzak (Tajikistan)
were built. Over the years, Beijing has not given up its attempts to implement a project for the
construction of the railway "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan" with further access to Turkmenistan and
the Persian Gulf. In this respect, for the PRC Central Asian region is a transit corridor, which could
eventually become a bridge between China and the Gulf states.
Famous Chinese researcher Zhao Huasheng in the mid 2000s identified 6 priority directions of
Chinese strategy in Central Asia. They are countering terrorism, separatism, extremism (so called
concept of the struggle against “Three Evils”), maintenance of safe state border regions, promoting
region-wide stability, participation in the economic development of the region, avoiding a situation
where the region could be influenced by states or military units, holding anti-China position, access to
regional energy resources. Problem of strengthening positions of China in multilateral cooperation
formats should be added to the directions above. Among them the SCO plays a role of mechanism,
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through which an approbation of multilateral leadership model with participation of China is possible.
At the same time leadership functions of PRC in the SCO caused at least by three factors. Director of
Research Center of SCO at the Shanghai Academy of Sciences Pan Guang considers these factors, as
China’s contribution to conceptual view of organization development (determination of base principles
of so called “Shanghai spirit”), the promotion of further institutionalization of SCO and practical support
of projects within the organization. Furthermore, it is the Chinese terminology of struggle against “Three
Evils” was taken up and continues to be used by members of SCO to indicate the efforts to counter new
challenges, and this, in turn, means that SCO fully accepts the position of China in these questions.
Multilateral cooperation in Central Asia, which has become the epitome of the Shanghai process,
allowing China to reduce conflicts with neighbors in this area and, at the same time, to start
implementing their economic interests, largely related to the energy sector. In addition, activities of the
SCO has become a way for China to gain experience promoting its own initiatives under the multifaceted
regional format and, as noted by Chinese experts, a new model of diplomatic interaction with neighbors
(i.e. a special type of partnership in comparison with the model of inter-state union that existed in China
and the Soviet Union).
Russian interests
Multilateral cooperation of the Russian Federation with the states of Central Asia (CA) in security,
in addition to the format of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), which, in fact, are the integration structures of the former Soviet republics,
is also carried out in the framework of the Shanghai Organization (SCO), member of which is People's
Republic of China (PRC). The presence of one of the largest regional powers, especially tending to
world leaders, definitely has a certain effect on the character of the Russian-Central Asian multilateral
cooperation in such an important and at the same time sensitive area as security.
China is one of the main locomotives of Shanghai process, that’s why from the very beginning it
took an active part in the development of multilateral cooperation mechanisms ("Shanghai Five", and
then – the SCO), it seems that the practical filling of cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian
countries in the field of security is already directly linked to China and Eurasian mission of the SCO.
All this gives reason to believe that in any future efforts of Russia in terms of cooperation with the
countries of Central Asia it is necessary to take into account not only the Chinese factor, but also increase
the value of the SCO in providing integrated security in Eurasia, including cooperation with Europe.
Over the past few years it has become quite clear that Russia has no desire to weaken its authority
in relation to the former Soviet bloc states. Recently, Ukraine has become a good example. Despite the
fact that Moscow is more concerned about the safety of its western borders and its geopolitical interests,
it has not forgotten about east.
In relationships with states of this region Russia relies on historic, demographic, economic and
cultural ties, which were formed since Russian Empire and Soviet Union. At the same time, Russia, of
course, cannot ignore new geopolitical realities, related to the increase in competitiveness environment
of international cooperation in Central Asia. Relationships with separate Central Asian states are
becoming elements of different paths of cooperation in bilateral and multilateral levels as well.
Mechanisms of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), The Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), The Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc), in fact, turned out to be a trial effort to create a workable framework for
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multilateral cooperation in the region. Formation of Customs Union and Common Economic Space of
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan became the resulting economic initiative for those post-Soviet countries
that were ready for cooperation and multi-speed integration. Among the mentioned organizations and
initiatives SCO holds a special place.
The official Russian position is based on the triple function of the SCO. Firstly, SCO is considered
as a format that can contribute to the formation of collective world leadership system. Secondly, SCO
should be part of “partnership network of regional associations” in Asia-Pacific region. And finally, the
organization, along with the mechanisms of the UN, CIS, CSTO, has a special role in international
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. In this case, the SCO is an organization that is different from other post-
Soviet associations. The process of its creation was gradual move towards a multilateral structure,
starting from bilateral cooperation. Unlike mechanisms such as the CIS or Collective Security Treaty
Organization, participation in the SCO has never been called into question by its members. Russian
researchers emphasize that despite the lack of opportunities for deeper integration in the field of security,
the SCO has a special political role in the region and due to its composition of participants has prospects
of achieving the global level.
Another driving factor in Central Asia is - market, in which Russian goods are sold. Here realized
a significant share of Russian food exports, machinery and transport equipment, and in recent years -
textile products. From Central Asia to Russia is directed a flow basis of migrant workers. The region is
a major supplier of energy resources, which are transported through the territory of Russia to the EU
markets. Russia aims to take a stronger position in the region, with an emphasis on strengthening
cooperation in the energy and defense sectors.
Conclusion
The fact that the SCO includes China and Russia is enough to ensure attention to the organization.
In recent years, the fear that there will be an alliance of Moscow and Beijing does not leave the Western
politicians. And in the first half of the 2000s the driving force of political rapprochement within the
SCO, actually, is the desire to denote "guests", that is, the United States, its limit in the region, in which
bosses are Russia and China.
In economic terms, the interests of two states are coinciding, especially in the energy sector, which
played a crucial role in the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia, as one of
the largest producer and exporter of oil and gas, and China, as second largest consumer of energy, have
mutual interests in development of cooperation in energy sector. Here, the SCO became one of the most
favorable forms of realization of interests.
Beijing regards the SCO as a mechanism to strengthen its presence in the Central Asian markets
and improving access to energy resources in the region. Moscow thinks the same, but about itself.
Economic dominance of China in the SCO is undeniable, both in policy purposefulness, and the volume
of funds that China may use to support it. So, at the summit in Yekaterinburg, China announced its
intention to allocate $10 billion for various projects within the organization that is more than Anti-Crisis
Fund, initiated by Russia in the Eurasian Economic Community. Experts have long noted that Moscow
deliberately slows down the economic integration of the SCO, knowing that each new initiative will
strengthen not Russian, but Chinese positions.
In political terms, the coincidence of the goals of two states have played an important role in SCO
development and in its focus on strengthening regional strategy, countering policy of unipolar world
and unilateral policy of USA in the post-Cold War by developing political balance and, eventually,
implementation of the idea of multipolar world. Interests of Russia and China in the field of defense and
security are also similar. They are countering separatist movements and extremism within the states and
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understanding of the need for a mechanism to ensure regional security, especially in Central Asia, in
order to counter threats such as terrorism and at the global level – the threat of NATO enlargement to
the East, the issue of the occupation of Afghanistan and the direct US military presence in Central Asian
region. These factors led to the emergence of a common understanding of the leaders of two countries -
China and Russia - the importance of security, who decided on the creation and development of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization within a very short period of time.
References
1.
Elena Kuzmina, Foreign economic interests as a factor of economic development in Central Asia.
Moscow Institute of Economics, 2013
2.
Koldunova E.W., The role of SCO in Central Asian region: comparative analysis of research
discourses, 2011
3.
Oleg Golishnikov, Central Asia at gunpoint of China: Implications for Russia, 2014
4.
Center for strategic estimates and projections
http://www.csef.ru/index.php/ru/politica-i-geopolitica/project/416-china-and-its-role-in-a-new-world-
order/1-stati/2093-goals-and-interests-of-china-and-russia-in-the-sco
5.
Article in Neue Zürcher Zeitung publication, author - Daniel Vehlin
6.
Central Asian Portal
http://www.ca-portal.ru/
7.
World Reference Service
http://china.polpred.com/
УДК 32:001.12/18
THE ISIS (Iraq and Syria Islamıc State)
Murat ERDİNÇ
Suleyman Demirel University
Introduction
Isis is coming from Jamaat Al – Tawhid Jihad which was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
1999. ISIS was alliance with Al – Qaida during that time. In 2004, it is reaching a larger Jihadi
appaerance in founding Majlis Shura al – Mujahedeen
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and after that it was Islamic State of Iraq in
2006. So, ISIS has arised as a major anti – imperialist force in the Middle East. It succeeded in building
a good structure, also it received a lot of supporters from a lot of countries. ISIS has some Jihadis
experiences from Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans(Bosnia,Kosova etc.) ISIS leaders developed itself with
a very pragmatic expansion strategy.
According to us; ISIS’ real source of power comes from their skills to advantage of the regional
social, political and economic chaos and the sectarianism introduced to the region.
In fact, ISIS developed a powerful story that answers and exploits the injustice behaviours that
Sunnis face across the region. After the Saddam regime in Iraq, the American occupying forces and Iraq
government forces persecuted to the Sunnis and succeeded in transforming the Sunni and Shia sects
parted into colliding political forces. Similar trends have been observed all over the Levant with the
rising of Hezbollah to the dangerous and detriment of the popular uprising that broke through in 2011.
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ISIS has been driving the Sunni thrust of taking back what is “rightfully” theirs, by promising them their
rise back to power as well as revenge against the West and the Shi’a.
ISIS catched the golden opportunity is Syria, by exploiting the different regional interests in
hosting a terrorist organization on or next to their territory, and how they used the international
organisations’ inactivity toward the Syrian peoples’ suffering to feed their assasinate story.
A-
The Rising Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
Fundamentals of ISISwas set up in Iraq as Islamıc State of Iraq(ISI) which is the transnational
group relying on the worldwide recruits to form their striking forces, was in decline after Obama’s
speech of US troops withdrawal from the Iraq. Losing the one of the major propagandas recruitment
tool, ISI was unable to act against even the Iraq’s goverment continuous marginalization and
persecution of Sunnis, which casted a shadow of a doubt on its capacity to achieve justice as they always
promised. Moreover the promise of democracy, rule of law, and equity that the Arab spring brought to
the region and the succession of what seemed like victorious revolutions against totalitarian regimes,
completely stole by the appeal left of Al – Qaeda. By the year 2011, ISI was no more than a small Al –
Qaeda elite group, hiding in small towns across the Iraq deserts. However, the Syrian regime’s bloody
oppression on civilians following the popular uprising that started in 2011 presented Al – Qaeda a golden
ticket back to the scene. In the beginning, ISI hid its presence in Syria, and entered the scene through
supporting Jabhat Al Nusra
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, an extremist but highly efficient Syrian fighting group.
Jabhat al – Nusra kept a low profile until April 2013, promoting their victories rather than their
affiliations, and building-up popular support through accomplishment in stead of preaching or using Al
– Qaeda traditional propaganda techniques. This strategy proved to be succesful the Syrian revolutionary
scene was already occupied by the Free Syrian Army, supported by a large faction of the Syrian people,
and Jabhat al – Nusra needed to standout to make a place for itself on the military scene. Following
strategic victories of Jabhat al – Nusra in Syria, ISI leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi announced in an audio
recording, on April 9, 2013, the creation of ISIS, and annexed Jabhat al – Nusra to it. Even though the
later challenged this announcement and swore allegiance to Ayman Al Zawahri, who is the leader of Al
– Qaeda in Afghanistan, Jabhat al – Nusra lost many of its men to ISIS handing over large territories
mainly in the northern and eastern parts of Syria.
The Free Syrian Army’s major assault on Aleppo, and the successive defeats of the Syrian regime
forces conceded in 2012, pushed Assad’s allies to militarily intervene. Actually, the intervention of
Hezbollah alongside Iraq Shia brigades in 2013 allowed the regime to regain control of central Syria,
and managed to enhance its fighting conditions. The impact of Shia militias’ involvement in Syria and
the undivided political and financial support Iran provided to Damascus has largely contributed to
growing sectarian tensions and supported the ISIS narrative. Indeed, the transnational Shia intervention
has legitimized the transnational Sunni counter intervention, mainly benefitting ISIS.
Additionally, ISIS exploited the political void left unfilled by the disorganized and divergent
Syrian opposition; indeed, the Syrian political elite failed in many attempts to provide a common
realistic vision. Although, the international community, represented by the Friends of the Syrian People
group, once supported the Syrian National Council, and later on the Syrian National Coalition, the Syrian
opposition was consumed and unable to provide services to local populations. Following important
victories in northern and eastern Syria, large areas were left without effective administration, electricity,
gas, and security, thus provoking discontent among locals against political leadership. On the other hand,
ISIS has a bipolar vision that has the virtue of being clear and simple. ISIS succeeded in restoring
asemblance of law and order, although the harsh punishments (based on their literalist fiqh
understanding) was both stifling to the Muslim local population and unforgiving to those deemed to be
apostates, including non-Muslim minorities.
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Western countries missed a golden opportunity to make good on their claims to promote justice
and democracy in the region. It must be remembered that the United States invaded Iraq, in part at least,
on claims to bring democracy. In Syria, when the people rose in pursuit of democratic aspirations, the
same United States was again not even willing to act seriously toward Syria. Regardless of political
considerations, the people of the region view this as sheer hypocrisy and betrayal to the democratic
impulses of then unarmed Syrian revolution. ISIS and Al – Qaeda were quick and decisive in exploiting
such inconsistency.
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